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Rational Actors and Rational Fools:
The Influence of Affect on Judgment
and Decision-Making
Paul Slovic*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The past decade has witnessed a burgeoning interest in the
application of behavioral science to the law.' An earlier paradigm,
centered around law and economics, is being challenged by those
who would infuse a heavy dose of cognitive psychology, behavioral
economics, and behavioral decision theory into this mix. 2 The frontispiece of a recent volume titled "Behavioral Law and Economics"3
defines this new field as one that aims to show how, with a clearer
knowledge of human behavior, we might be better able to predict
the actual effects of law and to assess the real, and potential, role
4
of law in society.
The traditional approach to law and economics has assumed
standard economic principles in which homo economicus maximizes utility within a stable set of preferences, after gathering and
processing information in an optimal way. Simon sharply criti* Professor of Psychology, University of Oregon; President, Decision Research. The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of his colleagues at
Decision Research to the development of the ideas in this paper. In particular,
Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, Donald MacGregor, Stephen Johnson, and Jim
Flynn contributed to the work on the affect heuristic, and Robin Gregory and Terre
Satterfield contributed to the general discussion of affect and rationality. Financial
support from the National Science Foundation under grant SBR-9876587 and from
Dean Kathleen Hall Jamieson of The Annenberg School for Communication of the
University of Pennsylvania is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to C. K. Mertz
for assistance with the data analysis reported in Section IIIB.
1. See, e.g., Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, BehavioralEconomics, and the Law, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1495 (1998).
2. See Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass. R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
3. See id.
4. See id.

163

164 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:163
cized this view, arguing that decision-making is better described in
terms of bounded rationality. 5 A boundedly rational decision
maker attempts to attain some satisfactory, although not necessarily maximal, level of achievement. Simon's conceptualization
highlighted the role of perception, cognition and learning in decision-making and directed researchers to examine the psychological
processes by which decision problems are represented and information is processed. 6
About the same time as Simon, Edwards introduced psychologists to the "exceedingly elaborate, mathematical and voluminous"
economic literature on choice and reviewed the handful of relevant
7
experimental studies then in existence.
During the subsequent years of the past century, the information processing view proposed by Simon has dominated empirical
research on judgment and decision-making.8 This has led to a torrent of studies aimed at describing and understanding the mental
operations associated with these behaviors. The result has been a
far more complicated portrayal of decision-making than that provided by utility maximization theory. It is now generally recognized among psychologists and among a growing number of legal
scholars that utility maximization provides only limited insight
into the processes by which decisions are made. For example, legal
scholars have become well aware of the research on the heuristics
and biases that affect judgments in the face of uncertainty. Discussions of hindsight bias, overconfidence, status quo bias, availability and representativeness appear frequently in the literature. 9
5. See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 Psychol. Rev. 129, 137-38 (1956).
6. See id. Some legal scholars have also rejected the standard view. Posner
contends that "economic analysis of law . .. long ago abandoned the model of
hyperrational, emotionless . . . nonstrategic man (or woman)[.J" Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1552
(1998).
7. See Ward Edwards, The Theory of Decision Making, 51 Psychol. Bull. 380
(1954).
8. See Simon, supra note 5, at 129-38.
9. See generally Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420 (1999)
(presenting empirical evidence of market manipulation and its role in market failure) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar 1U; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problemof Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
630 (1999) (reviewing thoroughly these phenomena and drawing out their implica-
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Preference and choice have also been subject to a great deal of
analysis by behavioral researchers and legal scholars. A basic assumption of rational theories of choice is the principle of invariance,10 which states that the relation of preference should not
change across equivalent descriptions of the options (description
invariance) or equivalent methods of elicitation (procedure invariance). Without stability across equivalent descriptions and
equivalent elicitation procedures, one's preferences cannot be represented as maximization of utility.
A sizable body of research now shows that description invariance and procedure invariance do not hold. Preferences appear to
be remarkably labile, sensitive to the way a choice problem is described or "framed" and sensitive to the mode of response used to
express the preferences." These failures of invariance have contributed to a new conception of judgment and choice in which beliefs and preferences are often constructed-not merely revealed-in
the elicitation process.
Among the specific empirical demonstrations of preference liability and manipulability that have interested legal scholars are
preference reversals, 12 prominence effects, 13 loss aversion,' 4 the
endowment effect,' 5 status quo and omission biases,' 6 framing
tions for market manipulation and products liability) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar
III.
10. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing
of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. 251 (1986); Amos Tversky et al., Contingent Weighting in
Judgment and Choice, 95 Psychol. Rev. 371 (1988).
11. See Baruch Fischhoff et al., Knowing What You Want: Measuring Labile

Values, in Cognitive Processes in Choice and Decision Behavior 11741 (Thomas S.
Wallsten ed., 1980); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211

Science 453 (1981).
12. See Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, Reversals of Preference Between
Bids and Choices in Gambling Decisions, 89 J. Experimental Psychol. 46 (1971);
Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, Response-Induced Reversals of Preference in
Gambling:An Extended Replication in Las Vegas, 101 J. Experimental Psychol. 16

(1973).
13. See Tversky et al., supra note 10.
14. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 11; Robin Gregory et al., The Role of
Past States in DeterminingReference Pointsfor Policy Decisions, 55 Organizational

Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 195 (1993).
15.

See Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible

Indifference Curves, 79 Amer. Econ. Rev. 1277 (1989).
16.

See Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Status-Quo and Omission Bias, 5 J.

Risk & Uncertainty 49 (1992).
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effects 17 and mental accounting effects.' 8
The many studies showing that people do not behave according to the dictates of utility theory have been troubling to economists, whose theories assume that people are rational in the sense
of having preferences that are complete and transitive and in the
sense of choosing what they most prefer. 19 Whatever the reluctance of economists to acknowledge these behavioral phenomena,
legal scholars are certainly examining them carefully. 20 As Sunstein observes:
Analysis of law should be linked with what we have been
learning about human behavior and choice. After all, the legal system is pervasively in the business of constructing preferences, descriptions, and contexts for choice . . . law can
construct rather than elicit preferences internally, by affecting what happens in ordinary transactions, market and
21
nonmarket.
Just as the law is continually evolving, so is our understanding of the psychology of human judgment, preference and choice.
Behavioral researchers are coming to recognize that there is another aspect of information-processing that has been rather neglected-this is the automatic, experiential, affect-based side of our
mental life, which appears every bit as important as the analytic/
deliberative side that has been the focus of much prior research.
This article will describe new theory and empirical findings
demonstrating the powerful influence of affect on decision-making.
This work goes beyond the heuristics and biases work, which was
highly analytical, into the domain of experiential (affect-based)
17. See Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preference for Alterna-

tive Therapies, 306 New Eng. J. Med. 1259 (1982).
18. See Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 Market-

ing Sci. 199 (1985).
19. See generally David M. Grether & Charles R. Plott, Economic Theory of
Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 623 (1979)

(reacting to early reports of violations of procedure invariance); Daniel M. Heusman, On Dogmatism in Economics: The Case of Preference Reversals, 20 J. Socio-

Economics 205 (1991) (criticizing economists for failing to take these findings
seriously).
20. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 9; Hanson & Kysar 11, supra note 9;
Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L.
Rev. 1471 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgmentand Decision Making in Legal Scholarship:A LiteratureReview, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1499

(1998); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2.
21. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2.
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thinking. After describing this perspective, I shall examine recent
studies demonstrating how experiential thinking misleads young
smokers and causes them to misperceive the risks of smoking. Because experiential thinking is essential to rational behavior yet capable of misguiding us, I will argue that we humans are both
Rational Actors and Rational Fools.

II. THE AFFECT HEURISTIC
This section introduces a theoretical framework that describes
the importance of affect in guiding judgments and decisions. As
used here, "affect" means the specific quality of "goodness" or "badness" (i) experienced as a feeling state (with or without conscious
awareness) and (ii) demarcating a positive or negative quality of a
stimulus. Affective responses occur rapidly and automatically-note how quickly you sense the feelings associated with the
stimulus word "treasure" or the word "hate." I shall argue that
reliance on such feelings can be characterized as "the affect heuristic." In this section, I shall briefly trace the development of the
22
affect heuristic across a variety of research paths.
A. Background
A strong early proponent of the importance of affect in decision-making was Zajonc, who argued that affective reactions to
stimuli are often the very first reactions, occurring automatically
and subsequently guiding information processing and judgment.
According to Zajonc, all perceptions contain some affect. "[w]e do
not just see 'a house': We see a handsome house, an ugly house, or
a pretentious house."23 He later adds:
We sometimes delude ourselves that we proceed in a rational
manner and weight all the pros and cons of the various alternatives. But this is probably seldom the actual case. Quite
often 'I decided in favor of X' is no more than 'I liked X' ....
We buy the cars we like,' choose the jobs and houses we find
22.

See Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in Intuitive Judgment: Heuris-

tics and Biases (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., forthcoming 2001) (on file with
author).
23. Robert B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences,
35 Am. Psychol. 151, 154 (1980).
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'attractive,' and then justify these choices by various reasons
24

Affect also plays a central role in what have come to be known
as "dual-process theories" of thinking, knowing and information
processing. As Epstein has observed:
There is no dearth of evidence in every day life that people
apprehend reality in two fimdamentally different ways, one
variously labeled intuitive, automatic, natural, non-verbal,
narrative, and experiential, and the other analytical, deliber25
ative, verbal, and rational.
Table 1,26 adapted from Epstein, further compares these two
systems. One of the characteristics of the experiential system is its
affective basis. Although analysis is certainly important in many
decision-making circumstances, reliance on affect and emotion is a
quicker, easier, and more efficient way to navigate in a complex,
uncertain and sometimes dangerous world. Many theorists have
given affect a direct and primary role in motivating behavior. Epstein's view on this is as follows:
The experiential system is assumed to be intimately associated with the experience of affect,... which refer[s] to subtle
feelings of which people are often unaware. When a person
responds to an emotionally significant event.., the experiential system automatically searches its memory banks for related events, including their emotional accompaniments ....
If the activated feelings are pleasant, they motivate actions
and thoughts anticipated to reproduce the feelings. If the
feelings are unpleasant, they motivate actions and thoughts
27
anticipated to avoid the feelings.
Also emphasizing the motivational role of affect, Mowrer conceptualized conditioned emotional responses to images as prospective gains and losses that directly "guide and control performance
in a generally sensible adaptive manner."2 8 He criticized theorists
who postulate purely cognitive variables, such as expectancies
(probabilities) intervening between stimulus and response, cautioning that we must be careful not to leave the organism at the
24. Id. at 155.
25. Seymour Epstein, Integrationof the Cognitive and Psychodynamic Unconscious, 49 Am. Psychol. 709, 710 (1994).
26. See infra app., tbl.l.
27. Epstein, supra note 25, at 716.
28. 0. Hobart Mowrer, Learning Theory and Behavior 30 (1960).
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choice point "lost in thought." Mowrer's solution was to view expectancies more dynamically (as conditioned emotions such as
hopes and fears), serving as motivating states leading to action.
One of the most comprehensive and dramatic theoretical accounts of the role of affect in decision-making is presented by the
neurologist Antonio Damasio, in his book Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain.2 9 Damasio's theory is derived
from observations of patients with damage to the ventromedial
frontal cortices of the brain that has left their basic intelligence,
memory and capacity for logical thought intact but has impaired
their ability to "feel"-that is, to associate affective feelings and
emotions with the anticipated consequences of their actions.30
Close observation of these patients combined with a number of experimental studies led Damasio to argue that this type of brain
damage induces a form of sociopathy 3 l that destroys the individual's ability to make rational decisions; that is, decisions that are
in his or her best interests. Persons suffering from this type of
damage became socially dysfunctional even though they remain intellectually capable of analytical reasoning.
Commenting on one particularly significant case, Damasio
observes:
The instruments usually considered necessary and sufficient
for rational behavior were intact in him. He had the requisite
knowledge, attention, and memory; his language was flawless; he could perform calculations; he could tackle the logic of
an abstract problem. There was only one significant accompaniment to his decision-making failure: a marked alteration
of the ability to experience feelings. Flawed reason and impaired feelings stood out together as the consequences of a
specific brain lesion, and this correlation suggested to me
that feeling was an integral component of the machinery of
reason.

32

29. Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human
Brain (1994).
30. See id.
31. See Antonio R. Damasio et aL, Individuals with Sociopathic Behavior
Caused by FrontalDamages Fail to Respond Automatically to Social Stimuli, 41
Behav. Brain Res. 81 (1990).
32. Damasio, supra note 29, at xii.
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In seeking to determine "what in the brain allows humans to behave rationally,"3 3 Damasio argues that thought is made largely
from images, broadly construed to include sounds, smells, real or
imagined visual impressions, ideas and words. 34 A lifetime of
learning leads these images to become "marked" by positive and
negative feelings linked directly or indirectly to somatic or bodily
states (Mowrer and other learning theorists would call this conditioning). "In short, somatic markers are... feelings generatedfrom
secondary emotions. These emotions and feelings have been connected, by learning,to predicted future outcomes of certain scenarios."3 5 When a negative somatic marker is linked to an image of a
future outcome it sounds an alarm. When a positive marker is associated with the outcome image, it becomes a beacon of incentive.
Damasio concludes that somatic markers increase the accuracy
and efficiency of the decision process and their absence degrades
performance by "compromising the rationality that makes us distinctly human and allows us to decide in consonance with a sense
36
of personal future, social convention, and moral principle."
Based on ideas about affect marking images, 3 7 which in turn
motivates behavior, 38 affect can be portrayed as an essential component in many forms of judgment and decision-making. Specifically it was proposed that people use an affect heuristic to make
judgments. 3 9 That is, representations of objects and events in people's minds are tagged to varying degrees with affect. In the process of making a judgment or decision, people consult or refer to an
"affect pool" containing all the positive and negative tags associated with the representations consciously or unconsciously. Just
as imaginability, memorability and similarity serve as cues for
probability judgments, 40 affect may serve as a cue for many important judgments. Relying on an affective impression can be far easier-more efficient-than weighing the pros and cons or retrieving
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 174.
36. Id. at xii.
37. See id.
38. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 25; Mowrer, supra note 28.
39. See Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risk
and Benefits, 13 J. Behav. Decision Making 1 (2000).
40. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristicsand Biases, 185 Science 1124 (1974) (describing the availability and representativeness heuristics).
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from memory many relevant examples, especially when the required judgment or decision is complex or mental resources are
limited. This characterization of a mental short-cut leads to labeling the use of affect a "heuristic."
B.

EmpiricalEvidence

This section presents and integrates a series of diverse studies
demonstrating the operation of the affect heuristic.
1.

ManipulatingPreferences Through ControlledExposures

The fundamental nature and importance of affect has been
demonstrated repeatedly in a remarkable series of studies by
Zajonc and his colleagues. 4 1 The concept of stimulus exposure is
central to all of these studies. The central finding is that, when
objects are presented to an individual repeatedly, the "mere exposure" is capable of creating a positive attitude or preference for
these objects.
In the typical study, stimuli such as nonsense phrases, faces or
Chinese ideographs are presented to the subject at varying frequencies. In a later session, the subject judges these stimuli on
liking or familiarity, or both. The more frequent the exposure to a
stimulus, the more positive the response. A meta-analysis of mere
exposure research published between 1968 and 1987 included over
42
200 experiments examining the exposure-affect relationship.
Unreinforced exposures were found to reliably enhance affect43 toward visual, auditory, gustatory, abstract, and social stimuli.
Winkielman, Zajonc and Schwarz demonstrated the speed
with which affect can influence judgments in studies employing a
Participants were "primed"
subliminal priming paradigm."
a frowning face, or a neutral
face,
a
smiling
through exposure to
polygon presented for 11250 of a second, an interval so brief that
there is no recognition or recall of the stimulus.4 5 Immediately fol41. See, e.g., Robert B. Zajonc, Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure, 9 J. Pers.
& Soc. Psychol. Monograph 1 (1968).
42. See Robert F. Bornstein, Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis
of Research, 1968-1987, 106 Psychol. Bull. 265 (1989).
43. See id.
44. See Piotr Winkielman et al., SubliminalAffective PrimingResists Attibutional Interventions, 11 Cognition and Emotion 43 (1997).
45. See id.
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lowing this exposure, an ideograph was presented for two seconds,
46
after which the subject rated the ideograph on a scale of liking.
Mean liking ratings were significantly higher for ideographs preceded by smiling faces. 4 7 This effect was lasting. In a second session, ideographs were primed by the "other face," the one not
associated with the stimulus in the first session.4 8 This second
priming was ineffective because the effect of the first priming
49
remained.
The perseverance of induced preferences was tested by Sherman, Kim and Zajonc 5 ° who asked participants to study Chinese
characters and their English meanings. 5 1 Half of the meanings
52
were positive (e.g., beauty), half were negative (e.g., disease).
Then participants were given a test of these meanings followed by
a test in which they were given pairs of characters and were asked
to choose the one they preferred. 53 Participants preferred characters with positive meaning 70% of the time. 54 Next, the characters
were presented with neutral meanings (e.g., desk, linen) and subjects were told that these were the "true" meanings.5 5 The testing
procedure was repeated and, despite learning the new meanings,
the preferences remained the same. 56 Characters that had been
initially paired with positive meanings still tended to be
57
preferred.
These various studies demonstrate that affect is a strong conditioner of preference, whether or not the cause of that affect is
consciously perceived. They also demonstrate the independence of
affect from cognition, indicating that there may be conditions of
affective or emotional arousal that do not necessarily require cognitive appraisal. This affective mode of response, unburdened by
cognition and hence much faster, has considerable adaptive value.
46. See
47. See
48. See
49. See
50. See
Preferences
51. See
52. See
53. See
54. See
55. See
56. See
57. See

id.
id.
id.
id.
D. A. Sherman et al., Affective Perseverance: Cognitions Change but
Stay the Same (1998).
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
Sherman et al., supra note 50.
id.
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2. Image, Affect and Decision-making
Consistent with the literature just reviewed, a number of nonlaboratory studies have also demonstrated a strong relationship
between imagery, affect and decision-making. 58 Many of these
studies used a word-association technique to discover the affective
connections that the individual had learned through life experiences. 5 9 This method presents subjects with a target stimulus,
usually a word or very brief phrase, and asks them to provide the
first thought or image that comes to mind.6 0 The process is then
repeated a number of times, say three to six, or until no further
associations are generated. 6 ' Following the elicitation of images,
subjects are asked to rate each image they give on a scale ranging
from very positive (e.g., +2) to very negative (e.g., -2), with a neutral point in the center.6 2 Scoring is done by summing or averag63
ing the ratings to obtain an overall index.
This imagery method has been used successfully to measure
the affective meanings that influence people's preferences for different cities and states6 4 as well as their support or opposition to
65
technologies such as nuclear power.
Table 266 illustrates the method in a task where one respondent was asked to give associations to each of two cities and, later,
to rate each image affectively. The cities in this example show the
clear affective superiority of San Diego over Denver. 67 The study
showed that summed image scores such as these were highly predictive of expressed preferences for living in or visiting cities.68 In
58. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Perceived Risk, Stigma, and Potential Economic Impacts of a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada, 11 Risk Analysis 683 (1991); Alida Benthin et al., Adolescent Health-Threateningand HealthEnhancingBehaviors:A Study of Word Association and Imagery, 17 J. Adolescent
Health 143 (1995); Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews
as OrientingDispositionsin the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J.

Applied Psychol. 1427 (1996); Donald G. MacGregor et al., Imagery, Affect, and
FinancialJudgment, 1 J. Psychol. & Fin. Markets 104 (2000).
59. See Slovic et al., supra note 58; Benthin et al., supra note 58.
60. See Slovic et al., supra note 58, at 688; Benthin, supra note 58, at 145.
61. See Slovic et al., supra note 58.
62. See id.

63. See id. at 690-91.
64. See id.

65. See Peters & Slovic, supra note 58, at 1428.
66. See infra app., tbl.2.

67. See Slovic et al., supra note 58.
68. See id. at 690.
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one study they found that the image score predicted the location of
actual vacations during the next eighteen months.6 9
Subsequent studies have found affect-laden imagery elicited
by word associations to be predictive of preferences for investing in
new companies on the stock market 70 and predictive of adolescents' decisions to take part in health-threatening and health-en71
hancing behaviors such as smoking and exercise.
3. Evaluability
The research described above points to the importance of affective impressions in judgments and decisions. However, the impressions themselves may vary not only in their valence but in the
precision with which they are held. It turns out that the precision
of an affective impression substantially impacts judgments.
The distributional qualities of affective impressions and responses can be conceptualized as "affective mappings." Consider,
for example, some questions posed by Mellers, Richards and Birnbaum: "How much would you like a potential roommate if all you
knew about her was that she was said to be intelligent?" 72 Or,
"Suppose, instead, all you knew about her was that she was said to
be obnoxious?" 73 Intelligence is a favorable trait but it is not very
diagnostic (e.g., meaningful) for likeableness, hence its affective
map is rather diffuse. 7 4 In contrast, obnoxiousness will likely pro75
duce a more precise and more negative impression.
How much would you like a roommate said to be both intelligent and obnoxious? Anderson has shown that the integration of
multiple pieces of information into an impression of this sort can
be described well by a weighted-average model where separate
weights are given to intelligence and obnoxiousness, respectively. 76 Mellers' study further showed that the weights in such
integrative tasks are inversely proportional to the variance of the
69. See id.

70. See MacGregor et al., supra note 58.
71. See Benthin et al., supra note 58.
72.

Barbara A. Mellers et al., Distributional Theories of Impression Forma-

tion, 51 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 313 (1992).
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See id.

76. See Norman H. Anderson, Foundations of Information Integration Theory
(1981).
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impressions. 77 Thus we would expect the impression produced by
the combination of these two traits to be closer to the impression
formed by obnoxiousness alone, reflecting greater weight given to
obnoxiousness due to its smaller variance (more precise affective
mapping). The meaning of a stimulus image appears to be reflected in the precision of the affective feelings associated with that
image. More precise affective impressions reflect more precise
meanings and carry more weight in impression formation, judgment and decision-making.
Hsee developed the notion of evaluability to describe the interplay between the precision of an affective impression and its mean78
ing or importance for judgment and decision-making.
Evaluability is illustrated by an experiment in which Hsee asked
people to assume they were music majors looking for a used music
dictionary. In a joint-evaluation condition, participants were
shown two dictionaries, A and B (see Table 3), and asked how
much they would be willing to pay for each. 79 Willingness-to-pay
was far higher for Dictionary B, presumably because of its greater
number of entries. However, when one group of participants evaluated only A and another group evaluated only B, the mean willingness to pay was much higher for Dictionary A. Hsee explains
this reversal by means of the evaluability principle. He argues
that, without a direct comparison, the number of entries is hard to
evaluate, because the evaluator does not have a precise notion of
how good or how bad 10,000 (or 20,000) entries are. However, the
defects attribute is evaluable in the sense that it translates easily
into a precise good/bad response and thus it carries more weight in
the independent evaluation. Most people find a defective dictionary unattractive and a like-new one attractive. Under joint evaluation, the buyer can see that B is far superior on the more

77. See Mellers et al., supra note 72.
78. See Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justification:How Unjustifiable Factors
Influence Judgments, 66 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 122
(1996) [hereinafter Hsee I]; Christopher K. Hsee, The EvaluabilityHypothesis: An
Explanation for Preference Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of
Alternatives, 67 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 242 (1996)
[hereinafter Hsee II]; Christopher K. Hsee, Less is Better: When Low-Value Options Are Valued More Highly Than High-Value Options, 11 J. Behav. Decision
Making 107 (1998) [hereinafter Hsee III].
79. See infra app., tbl.3.
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important attribute, number of entries. Thus number of entries
becomes evaluable through the comparison process.
According to the evaluability principle, the weight of a stimulus attribute in an evaluative judgment or choice is proportional to
the ease or precision with which the value of that attribute (or a
comparison on the attribute across alternatives) is mapped into an
affective impression. In other words, affect bestows meaning on
information8 o and the precision of the affective meaning influences
our ability to use information in judgment and decision-making.
Evaluability can thus be seen as an extension of the general relationship between the variance of an impression and its weight in
8
an impression-formation task. '
Hsee's work in evaluability is noteworthy because it shows
that even very important attributes may not be used by a judge or
decision maker unless they can be translated precisely into an affective frame of reference. As described in the next section, Hsee
finds evaluability effects even with familiar attributes such as the
amount of ice cream in a cup. 8 2 Similar effects have also been
demonstrated with other familiar things such as amounts of
money or human lives.
4. ProportionDominance
In situations that involve uncertainty about whether we will
win or lose or that involve ambiguity about some quantity of something (i.e., how much is enough), there appears to be one information format that is highly evaluable, leading it to carry great
weight in many judgment tasks. This is a representation characterizing an attribute as a proportion or percentage of something, or
as a probability. We shall refer to the strong effects of this type of
representation as "proportion dominance." 83
A mundane and innocent form of proportion dominance has
been demonstrated by Hsee, who found that an overfilled ice cream
container with 7 oz. of ice cream was valued more highly (measured by willingness to pay) than an underfilled container with 8
oz. of ice cream.8 4 This "less is better effect" reversed itself when
80.
81.
82.
83.

See Charles E. Osgood et al., The Measurement of Meaning (1957).
See Mellers et al., supra note 72.
See Hsee III, supra note 78, at 111-14.
I thank Chris Hsee for suggesting this term.

84. See Hsee III, supra note 78; infra app., fig.1.
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the options were juxtaposed and evaluated together.8 5 Thus, the
proportion of the serving cup that was filled appeared to be more
evaluable (in separate judgments) than the absolute amount of ice
86
cream.
A rather different demonstration of proportion dominance
comes from studies of preferences among simple gambles. It has
long been known that the rated attractiveness of a gamble offering
the chance to win some monetary payoff was typically more deter87
mined by the probability of winning that by the size of the payoff.

Consider the gamble offering 7 chances out of 36 (played on a roulette wheel with 36 numbers) to win $9 (otherwise get nothing).
The relatively high weight given the probability when rating
the attractiveness of such gambles may be explained by the fact
that the probabilities are more readily interpreted as attractive or
unattractive than are the payoffs. For example, seven out of
thirty-six chances to win are rather unattractive odds; on the other
hand, a $9 payoff may be harder to evaluate because its attractiveness depends upon what other payoffs are available.
If we could make a gamble's payoff more evaluable, that is,
more readily perceived as good or bad, we would presumably enhance the weight given to payoff in the attractiveness rating.8 8
One group of subjects rated the gamble, 7/36 win $9, on a twentypoint scale varying from zero (not at all attractive) to twenty (very
attractive).8 9 The mean rating was 9.4.9
Hypothesizing that the attractiveness of $9 might not be readily apparent, we reasoned that a bet offering $9 to win and only 50
to lose should appear to have a very attractive payoff ratio. 9 1 This
led us to predict that one might increase the attractiveness of a
gamble by adding a small loss to it.92 This prediction was con85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein, Relative Importance of Probabilities
and Payoffs in Risk Taking, 78 J. Experimental Psychol. Monograph 1 (1968); William M. Goldstein & Hillel J. Einhorn, Expression Theory and the PreferenceReversal Phenomena, 94 Psychol. Rev. 236 (1987).
88. See Slovic et al., supra note 22.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.

92. See id.
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firmed. Adding a 5v loss boosted the mean attractiveness rating
from 9.4 to 14.9. 9 3
This curious finding, that adding a small loss to a gamble increases its rated attractiveness, fits well with the notions of affective mapping and evaluability. According to this view, a
probability maps relatively precisely onto the attractiveness scale
because probability has a lower and upper bound (0 and 1) and a
midpoint below which a probability is "poor" or "bad" (i.e., has
worse than an even chance) and above which it is "good" (i.e., has a
better than even chance). People know where a given value, such
as 7/36, falls within the bounds, and what it means-"I'm probably
not going to win." In contrast, the mapping of a dollar outcome
(e.g., $9) onto the attractiveness scale is diffuse, reflecting a failure
to know how good or bad or how attractive or unattractive $9 is.
Thus, the impression formed by the gamble offering $9 to win with
no losing payoff is dominated by the relatively precise and unattractive impression produced by the 7/36 probability of winning.
However, adding a very small loss to the payoff dimension brings
the $9 payoff into focus and thus gives it meaning. The combination of a possible $9 gain and a 5¢ loss is a very attractive win/loss
ratio, leading to a relatively precise mapping onto the upper end of
the scale. Whereas the imprecise mapping of the $9 carries little
weight in the averaging process, the more precise and now
favorable impression of $9 and 5¢ carries more weight, thus leading to an increase in the overall favorability of the gamble.
Proportion dominance surfaces in a powerful way in a very different context, studies of life-saving interventions.9 4 For example,
one study found that people's willingness to intervene to save a
stated number of lives was determined more by the proportion of
lives saved than by the actual number of lives that would be
saved. 9 5 However, when two or more interventions were directly
compared, number of lives saved became more important than pro93. See id.
94. See David Fethersonhaugh et al., Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life:
A Study of Psychophysical Numbing, 14 J. Risk & Uncertainty 283 (1997);
Jonathan Baron, Confusion of Relative and Absolute Risk in Valuation, 14 J. Risk
& Uncertainty 301 (1997); Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the
"IdentifiableVictim Effect," 14 J. Risk & Uncertainty 235 (1997); James Friedrich
et al., PsychophysicalNumbing: When Lives Are Valued Less as the Lives At Risk
Increase, 8 J. Consumer Psychol. 277 (1999).
95. See Fetherstonhaugh et al., supra note 94, at 297.
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portion saved. 96 Thus, number of lives saved, standing alone, appears to be poorly evaluable, 97 as was the case for number of
entries in Hsee's music dictionaries. With a side-by-side comparison, the number of lives became clearly evaluable and important, 98
as also happened with the number of dictionary entries.
Slovic, drawing upon proportion dominance and the limited
evaluability of numbers of lives, predicted (and found) that people
would more strongly support an airport-safety measure expected to
save 98% of 150 lives at risk than a measure expected to save 150
lives. 9 9 Saving 150 lives is diffusely good, hence only weakly
evaluable, whereas saving 98% of something is clearly very good
because it is so close to the upper bound on the percentage scale,
and hence is highly evaluable and highly weighted in the support
judgment. 1°° Subsequent reduction of the percentage of 150 lives
that would be saved to 95%, 90%, and 85% led to reduced support
for the safety measure but each of these percentage conditions still
garnered a higher mean level of support than did the save 150 lives
condition.' 0 1
5. Insensitivity to Probability
Outcomes are not always affectively as vague as the quantities
of money, ice cream and lives that were dominated by proportion in
the above experiments. When consequences carry sharp and
strong affective meaning, as is the case with a lottery jackpot or a
cancer, the opposite phenomenon occurs-variation in probability
often carries too little weight. As Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee and
Welch observe, one's images and feelings toward winning the lottery are likely to be similar whether the probability of winning is
one in 10 million or one in 10,000.102 They further note that response to uncertain situations appears to have an all or none characteristic that is sensitive to the possibility rather than the
96. See id. at 296-97.
97. See id. at 297.
98. See id. at 291.
99. See Slovic et al., supra note 22. This was, of course, a between-groups
study. In a side-by-side comparison, everyone gives more support to saving all 150
lives.
100. See id.
101. See id.; infra app., tbl.4.
102. See George Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, Psychol. Bull. (forthcoming 2001).
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probability of strong positive or negative consequences, causing
very small probabilities to carry great weight.'10 This, they argue,
helps explain many paradoxical findings such as the simultaneous
prevalence of gambling and the purchasing of insurance.'04 It also
explains why societal concerns about hazards such as nuclear
power and exposure to extremely small amounts of toxic chemicals
fail to recede in response to information about the very small
probabilities of the feared consequences from such hazards.' 0 5
Support for these arguments comes from Rottenstreich and Hsee,
who show that if the potential outcome of a gamble is emotionally
powerful, its attractiveness or unattractiveness is relatively insensitive to changes in probability as great as from .99 to .01.106
6. The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risk and Benefit
Another stream of research that, in conjunction with many of
the findings reported above, led to recognition of the affect heuristic, had its origin in an early study of risk perception. 0 7 One of the
findings in that study and subsequent replications of it was that
perception of risk and society's response to risk was strongly linked
to the degree to which a hazard evoked feelings of dread.' 0 8 Thus
activities associated with cancer (e.g., activities exposing people to
radiation or toxic chemicals) are seen as riskier and more in need
of regulation than activities associated with less dreaded forms of
illness, injury, and death (e.g., accidents).
A second finding in the study' 0 9 has been even more instrumental in the study of the affect heuristic. This is the finding that
judgments of risk and benefit are negatively correlated. 1 10 For
many hazards, the greater the perceived benefit, the lower the per103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See Nancy Kraus et al., Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of
Chemical Risks, 12 Risk Analysis 215 (1992).
106. See Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses & Electric
Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, Psychol. Sci. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript on file with author).
107. See Baruch Fischhoff et al., How Safe is Safe Enough? A Psychometric
Study of Attitudes Towards Technological Risks and Benefits, 9 Policy Sci. 127
(1978).
108. See id. at 140; Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280, 281-83
(1987).
109. See Fischhoff et al., supra note 107.
110. See id. at 148-49.
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ceived risk and vice versa.'1 1 Smoking, alcoholic beverages and
food additives, for example, tend to be seen as very high in risk and
relatively low in benefit, whereas vaccines, antibiotics and x-rays
1 2
tend to be seen as high in benefit and relatively low in risk.
This negative relationship is noteworthy because it occurs even
when the nature of the gains or benefits from an activity is distinct
and qualitatively different from the nature of the risks. That the
inverse relationship is generated in people's minds is suggested by
the fact that risk and benefit generally tend to be positively (if at
all) correlated in the world. 1 3 Activities that bring great benefits
may be high or low in risk but activities that are low in benefit are
unlikely to be high in risk (if they were, they would be
114
proscribed).
A study by Alhakami and Slovic found that the inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit of an activity (e.g., using pesticides) was linked to the strength of positive or
negative affect associated with that activity." 15 This result implies
that people base their judgments of an activity or a technology not
only on what they think about it but also on what they feel about
it.116

If they like an activity, they are moved to judge the risks as

low and the benefits as high; if they dislike it, they tend to judge
1 7
the opposite-high risk and low benefit.
Alhakami and Slovic's findings suggested that use of the affect
heuristic guides perceptions of risk and benefit, as depicted in Figure 2.118 If so, providing information about risk should change the
perception of benefit and vice-versa. 1 19 For example, information
stating that benefit was high for some technology should lead to
more positive overall affect that would, in turn, decrease perceived
111. See id.
112. See id. at 147.
113. See id. at 148-49.
114. See id. This inverse relationship is found as well when the correlation is
computed across individuals judging the same activity. Thus one person may judge
nuclear power to be high in risk and low in benefit whereas another might judge it
low in risk and high in benefit.
115. See Ali S. Alhakami & Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse
Relationship Between PerceivedRisk and PerceivedBenefit, 14 Risk Analysis 1085
(1994).
116. See id. at 1088.
117. See id. at 1094-95.
118. See infra app., fig.2.
119. See infra app., fig.3.
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risk. 120 Indeed, Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic and Johnson conducted this experiment, providing four different kinds of information designed to manipulate affect by increasing or decreasing
12 1
perceived risk and increasing or decreasing perceived benefit.
In each case there was no apparent logical relation between the
information provided (e.g., information about risks) and the
nonmanipulated variable (e.g., benefits). 122 The predictions were
confirmed.123 When the information that was provided changed either the perceived risk or the perceived benefit, an affectively congruent but inverse effect was observed on the non-manipulated
attribute, as depicted in Figure 3.124 These findings support the
theory that risk and benefit judgments are causally determined, at
least in part, by the overall affective evaluation.
The affect heuristic also predicts that using time pressure to
reduce the opportunity for analytic deliberation (and thereby allowing affective considerations freer rein), should enhance the inverse relationship between perceived benefits and risks. In a
second study, Finucane and others showed that the inverse relationship between perceived risks and benefits increased under
time pressure, as predicted. 12 5 These two experiments with judgments of benefits and risks are important because they support the
contention by Zajonc that affect influences judgment directly and
126
is not simply a response to a prior analytic evaluation.
7.

Judgments of Probability,Relative Frequency, and Risk

The affect heuristic has much in common with the model of
"risk as feelings" proposed by Loewenstein and with dual process
theories put forth by Epstein, Sloman and others. 12 7 Recall that
Epstein argues that individuals apprehend reality by two interactive, parallel processing systems. 128 The rationalsystem is a de120. See Alkahmi & Slovic, supra note 115, at 1094-95.
121. See Finucane et al., supra note 39.
122. See id. at 1.
123. See id.
124. See infra app., fig.3.
125. See Finucane et al., supra note 39, at 9-13.
126. See Zajonc, supra note 24.
127. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 102; Epstein, supra note 25; Steven A.
Sloman, The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 Psychol. Bull. 3
(1996).
128. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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liberative, analytical system that functions by way of established
rules of logic and evidence (e.g., probability theory). 12 9 The experiential system encodes reality in images, metaphors and narratives
130
to which affective feelings have become attached.
To demonstrate the influence of the experiential system,
Denes-Raj and Epstein showed that, when offered a chance to win
a prize by drawing a red jelly bean from an urn, subjects often
elected to draw from a bowl containing a greater absolute number,
but a smaller proportion, of red beans (e.g., 7 in 100) than from a
bowl with fewer red beans but a better probability of winning (e.g.,
1 in 10).131 For these individuals, images of 7 winning beans in the
large bowl appeared to dominate the image of 1 winning bean in
l3 2
the small bowl.
We can characterize Epstein's subjects as following a mental
strategy of "imaging the numerator" (i.e., the number of red beans)
and neglecting the denominator (the number of beans in the bowl).
Consistent with the affect heuristic, images of winning beans convey positive affect that motivates choice.
Although the jelly bean experiment may seem frivolous, imaging the numerator brings affect to bear on judgments in ways that
can be both non-intuitive and consequential. Slovic, Monahan and
MacGregor demonstrated this in a series of studies in which experienced forensic psychologists and psychiatrists were asked to judge
the likelihood that a mental patient would commit an act of vio33
lence within 6 months after being discharged from the hospital.1
An important finding was that clinicians who were given another
expert's assessment of a patient's risk of violence framed in terms
of a relative frequency (e.g., of every 100 patients similar to Mr.
Jones, 10 are estimated to commit an act of violence to others) subsequently labeled Mr. Jones as more dangerous than did clinicians
who were shown a "statistically equivalent" risk expressed as a
129. See id.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 24-30.
131. See Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive
and RationalProcessing: When People Behave Against Their Better Judgment, 66

J. Personality & Social Psychol. 819 (1994).
132. See id. at 823.
133. See Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication:
The Effects of Using Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing
ProbabilityVersus Frequency Formats, 24 L. & Hum. Behav. 271 (2000).
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probability' 3 ' (e.g., "Patients similar to Mr. Jones are estimated to
have a 10% chance of committing an act of violence to others" 3 5).
Similar results have been found by Yamagishi, whose judges rated
a disease that kills 1,286 people out of every 10,000 as more dan36
gerous than one that kills 24.14% of the population.'
Not surprisingly, when clinicians were told that "20 out of
every 100 patients similar to Mr. Jones are estimated to commit an
act of violence,"' 3 7 41% would refuse to discharge the patient. 138
But when another group of clinicians was given the risk as "patients similar to Mr. Jones are estimated to have a 20% chance of
committing an act of violence," only 21% would refuse to discharge
139
the patient.
Follow-up studies showed that representations of risk in the
form of individual probabilities of 10% or 20% led to relatively benign images of one person, unlikely to harm anyone, whereas the
"equivalent" frequentistic representations created frightening
images of violent patients (e.g., "Some guy going crazy and killing
someone").14° These affect-laden images likely induced greater
perceptions of risk in response to the relative-frequency frames.
Although frequency formats produce affect-laden imagery,
story and narrative formats appear to do even better in that regard. Hendrickx, Vlek and Oppewal found that warnings were
more effective when, rather than being presented in terms of relative frequencies of harm, they were presented in the form of vivid,
affect-laden scenarios and anecdotes."14 Sanfey and Hastie found
that, compared with respondents given information in bar graphs
or data tables, respondents given narrative information more accu-

134. See id. at 289-90.
135, Id.
136. See Kimihiko Yamagishi, When a 12.86% Mortality is More Dangerous
than 24.14%: Implicationsfor Risk Communication, 11 Applied Cognitive Psychol.
495, 504 (1997).
137. Slovic et al., supra note 133, at 288.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 291-93.
141. See Laurie Hendrickx et al., Relative Importance of Scenario Information
and FrequencyInformation in the Judgment of Risk, 72 Acta Psychologica 41, 5860 (1989).
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14 2
rately estimated the performance of a set of marathon runners.
Furthermore, Pennington and Hastie found that jurors construct
narrative-like summations of trial evidence to help them process
their judgments of guilt or innocence. 14 3 The potency of narrative
may be due to affect increasing the memorability of information'"
turn
or enhancing individuals' engagement in the task which in 145
information.
of
integration
and
facilitates the comprehension
Perhaps the biases in probability and frequency judgment that
have been attributed to the availability heuristic 146 may be due, at
least in part, to affect. Availability may work not only through
ease of recall or imaginability, but because remembered and
imagined images come tagged with affect. For example, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman and Combs invoked availability to
explain why judged frequencies of highly publicized causes of
death (e.g., accidents, homicides, fires, tornadoes and cancer) were
relatively overestimated and underpublicized causes (e.g., diabetes, stroke, asthma, tuberculosis) were underestimated. 1 4 7 The
highly publicized causes appear to be more affectively charged,
that is, more sensational, and this may account both for their
prominence in the media and their relatively overestimated
frequencies.

III. FURTHER EVIDENCE
The studies described above represent only a small fraction of
that can be marshaled in support of the affect heurisevidence
the
tic. Although we have developed the affect heuristic to explain
findings from studies of judgment and decision-making (e.g., the
inverse relationship between perceived risks and benefits), one can
142. See Alan Sanfey & Reid Hastie, Does Evidence PresentationFormatAffect
Judgment? An Experimental Evaluation of Displays of Data for Judgments, 9
Psychol. Sci. 99, 103 (1998).
143. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Theory of Explanation-BasedDecision Making, in Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods 188, 194-96 (G.

Klein et al. eds., 1993).
144. See Vincent Price & Edward J. Czilli, Modeling Patternsof News Recognition and Recall, 46 J. Comm. 55 (1996).
145. See Keith Oatley, A Taxonomy of Literary Response and a Theory of Identification in FictionalNarrative, 23 Poetics 53 (1994).
146. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristicfor Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 Cognitive Psychol. 207 (1973).
147. See Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. Ex-

perimental Psychol.: Hum. Learning & Memory 551 (1978).
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find related proposals in the literature of marketing and social cognition. For example, Wright proposed the "affect-referral heuristic"
with a
as a mechanism by which the remembered affect associated
148
product.
that
of
choice
subsequent
product influences
Attitudes have long been recognized as having a strong evaluative component.14 9 Pratkanis defined attitude as "a person's evaluation of an object of thought."150 He went on to propose that
attitudes serve as heuristics, with positive attitudes invoking a
favoring strategy toward an object and negative attitudes creating
disfavoring response. 15 1 More specifically, he defined the "attitude
heuristic" as the use of the evaluative relationship as a cue for assigning objects to a favorable class or an unfavorable class, thus
leading to approach or avoidance strategies appropriate to the
class.' 5 2 Pratkanis described numerous phenomena that could be
explained by the attitude heuristic, including halo effects not unlike the consistency described earlier between risk and benefit
53
judgments.'
Other important work within the field of social cognition includes studies by Fazio l 54 on the accessibility of affect associated
with attitudes and by Schwarz and Clore on the role of affect as
55
information.'
Hsee and Kunreuther have demonstrated that affect influences decisions about whether or not to purchase insurance. 5 6 In
one study, they found that people were willing to pay twice as
much to insure a beloved antique clock (that no longer works and
148. See Peter Wright, Consumer Choice Strategies: Simplifying Versus Optimizing, 12 J. Marketing Res. 60 (1975); Michel T. Pham, Representativeness,Relevance, and the Use of Feelings in DecisionMaking, 25 J. Consumer Res. 144 (1998).
149. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 7.
150. Anthony R. Pratkanis, The Cognitive Representationof Attitudes, in Attitude Structure and Function 72 (Anthony R. Pratkanis et al. eds., 1989).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See Finucane et al., supra note 39.
154. See Russell H. Fazio, Attitudes as Object-EvaluationAssociations: Determinants, Consequences, and Correlates of Attitude Accessibility, in Attitude
Strength: Antecedents and Consequences 247 (Richard F. Petty & Jon A. Krosnick
eds., 1995).
155. See Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore, How Do I Feel About It? Informative Functions of Affective States, in Affect, Cognition, and Social Behavior: New
Evidence and Integrative Attempts (Klaus Fiedler & Joseph P. Forgas eds., 1988).
156. See Christopher K. Hsee & Howard Kunreuther, The Affection Effect in
Insurance Decisions, 20 J. Risk & Uncertainty 141, 153-54 (2000).
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cannot be repaired) against loss in shipment to a new city than to
insure a similar clock for which one does not have any special feeling. 157 In the event of loss, the insurance paid $100 in both
cases. 158 Similarly, Hsee and Menon found that students were
more willing to buy a warranty on a newly purchased used car if it
was a beautiful convertible than if it was an ordinary looking station wagon, even if the expected repair expenses and cost of the
warranty were held constant. 15 9
A study by Loewenstein and others provides a particularly
thorough review and analysis of research that supports their "riskas-feelings hypothesis," a concept that has much in common with
the affect heuristic. 160 They present evidence showing that emotional responses to risky situations, including feelings such as
worry, fear, dread or anxiety, often diverge from cognitive evaluations and have a different and sometimes greater impact on risktaking behavior than do cognitive evaluations. 16 1 Among the factors that appear to influence risk behaviors by acting on feelings
rather than cognitions are background mood, 162 the time interval
between decisions and their outcomes, 6 3 vividness, 16 4 and evolutionary preparedness. Loewenstein and others invoke the evolutionary perspective to explain why people tend to react with little
fear to certain types of objectively dangerous stimuli that evolution
has not prepared them for, such as guns, hamburgers, automobiles, smoking and unsafe sex, even when they recognize the threat
at a cognitive level. 16 5 Other types of stimuli, such as caged spiders, snakes or heights, which evolution may have prepared us to
fear, evoke strong visceral responses even when we recognize
them, cognitively, to be harmless. 166
157. See id. at 150-51.
158. See id. at 151.
159. See Christopher K. Hsee & S. Menon, Affection Effect in Consumer Choices
(1999) (unpublished study).
160. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 102.
161. See id.
162. See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson & Amos Tversky, Affect, Generalization,and the
Perceptionof Risk, 45 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 20 (1983); Alice M. Isen, Positive Affect and Decision Making, in Handbook of Emotions 261 (Michael Lewis &
Jeannette M. Haviland eds., 1993).
163. See George Loewenstein, Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption, 97 Econ. J. 666 (1987).
164. See Hendrickx, supra note 141, at 55-56.
165. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 102.
166. See id.
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Individual differences in affective reactivity also are informative. Damasio relied upon brain-damaged individuals, apparently
lacking in the ability to associate emotion with anticipated outcomes, to test his somatic-marker hypothesis. 167 Similar insensitivity to the emotional meaning of future outcomes has been
attributed to psychopathic individuals and used to explain their
aberrant behaviors. 16 Using the Damasio card-selection task, Peters and Slovic found that normal subjects who reported themselves to be highly reactive to negative events made fewer
selections from decks with large losing payoffs.' 69 Conversely,
greater self-reported reactivity to positive events was associated
with a greater number of selections from high-gain decks.'170 Thus
individual differences in affective reactivity appear to play a role in
the learning and expression of risk-taking preferences.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS FOR LAw:

THE

RATIONALITY OF

CIGARETTE SMOKING

I have, in Section II, provided a brief description of the experiential mode of thinking and its embodiment in "the affect heuristic." A large number of theoretical and empirical studies,
conducted by a multidisciplinary cadre of scientists (from neurologists to social psychologists), have created a view of human rationality that is much more complex than the standard economic
model. One might expect that such a broad theory of human thinking and rationality would relate to the law in many important
ways and this, indeed, is being demonstrated. For example,
Kahneman and colleagues have shown that monetary judgments
as diverse as willingness to pay for the provision of a public good
(e.g., protection of an endangered species) or a punitive damage
award in a personal injury lawsuit seem to be derived from atti-

167. See Damasio, supra note 29.
168. See Robert D. Hare, Psychopathy, FearArousal and Anticipated Pain, 16
Psychol. Rep. 499 (1965); Christopher J. Patrick, Emotion and Psychopathy: Startling New Insights, 31 Psychophysiology 415 (1994).
169. See Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Springs of Action: Affective and Analytical Information Processingin Choice, 26 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1465
(2000).
170. See id.
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tudes based on emotion rather than on indicators of economic
71
value.1
In this section I shall discuss another important activity, cigarette smoking, the rationality of which has been under scrutiny by
the law. For many years, law and economics have been brought to
bear on this activity in a rather standard way. I shall draw upon
our understanding of experiential thinking and the affect heuristic
to document the inadequacies of the standard account.
A. Do Cigarette Smokers Know the Risks?
In numerous legal battles around the country, lawyers for the
cigarette industry have been relying heavily on the argument that
smokers know the health risks of cigarettes and are making a rational decision to smoke because the benefits to them outweigh the
risks. Such "informed consumers," the lawyers claim, have no
cause for complaint if they become ill.
Do individuals really know and understand the risks entailed
by their smoking decisions? This question is particularly important
in the case of young persons, because most smokers start during
childhood and adolescence. After many years of intense publicity
about the hazards of smoking cigarettes, it is generally believed
that every teenager and adult in the United States knows that
smoking is hazardous to one's health. Perhaps the most enthusiastic empirical demonstration of this "fact" comes from research on
perceptions of risk from smoking reported in two papers and in a
17 2
book by Viscusi.

Viscusi aimed to address the following question: "at the time
when individuals initiate their smoking activity, do they understand the consequences of their actions and make rational decisions?" 173 Viscusi further defined the appropriate test of
rationality in terms of "whether individuals are incorporating the
available information about smoking risks and are making sound
171. See Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinantsof Stated Willingness
to Pay for Public Goods:A Study in the HeadlineMethod, 9 J. Risk & Uncertainty 5
(1994); Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrageand ErraticAwards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. Risk & Uncertainty 49, 49-51 (1998).
172. See W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking: Making the Risky Decision (1992) [hereinafter Viscusi I]; W. Kip Viscusi, Do Smokers Underestimate Risk?, 98 J. Pol. Econ.
1253 (1990); W. Kip Viscusi, Variations in Risk Perceptions and Smoking Decisions, 73 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 577 (1991).
173. Viscusi I, supra note 172, at 11.

190 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:163
decisions, given their own preference .... "1 7 4 Viscusi even questioned whether one's future self may have different preferences,
though he never tested this possibility: "Does the 20-year old
smoker fully recognize how his or her future self will value health
as compared with smoking?" 1 75 In keeping with the analytic mode
of thinking, Viscusi's beginning smoker is portrayed as a young
economist, weighing the benefits against the risks before making
the fateful decision to light up: "one might expect some individuals
to rationally choose to smoke if the weight they place on the benefits derived from smoking exceeds their assessment of the expected
76
losses stemming from the risks .... -1
The data relied upon by Viscusi consisted of a national survey
of more than 3,000 persons age 16 or older in which respondents
were asked: "Among 100 cigarette smokers, how many do you
think will get lung cancer because they smoke?"'17 7 Analyzing responses to this question, Viscusi found that people greatly overestimated the risks of a smoker getting lung cancer. 1 78 They also
overestimated overall mortality rates from smoking and loss of life
expectancy from smoking. 179 Moreover, young people (age 16-21)
overestimated these risks to an even greater extent than did older
people.' 8 0 Perceptions of risk from smoking were also found to be
predictive of whether and how much people smoked, for young and
old alike.' 8 '
Viscusi argued that those data support a rational learning
model in which consumers respond appropriately to information
and make reasonable tradeoffs between the risks and benefits of
smoking.' 8 2 With respect to youth, he concluded that his findings
"strongly contradict the models of individuals being lured into
smoking at an early age without any cognizance of the risks
....
3 Viscusi further concluded that young people are so well174. Id. at 12.
175. Id. at 119.
176. Id. at 139.
177. Id. at 64.
178. See id. at 68. The mean estimate was 43 of 100, compared to an actuarial
value that Viscusi claimed was only 5-10 of 100. Similar overestimation was found
in subsequent studies asking about lung cancer mortality rather than incidence.
179. See Viscusi I, supra note 172, at 77.
180. See id. at 72.
181. See id. at 99-100.
182. See id. at 100.
183. Id. at 143.
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informed that there is no justification for informational campaigns
designed to boost their awareness.'" Finally, he observed that social policies that allow smoking at age eighteen "run little risk of
exposing uninformed decision-makers to the potential hazards of
smoking .... " 1 8 5 Viscusi's data and conclusions thus appear to
lend support to the defense used by cigarette companies to fend off
lawsuits from diseased smokers: These people knew the risks and
made an informed, rational choice to smoke.18 6
Viscusi's arguments would seem, at first glance, to have merit
from the standpoint of experiential thinking as well as from his
analytic perspective. On experiential grounds, the well-known association of cigarettes with cancer, a dreaded disease, should create enough negative affect to stimulate a powerful drive to avoid
this harmful behavior. Consistent with this view, many people do
decide not to smoke or to quit smoking. The minority who initiate
smoking or maintain the habit may also be doing so on the basis of
informed experiential or analytic thinking that has led them to
conclude that the benefits outweigh the risks.
184. See id. at 143-44.
185. Viscusi I, supra note 172, at 149.

186. Viscusi interpreted his findings as follows: "there is substantial evidence
that individuals make tradeoffs with respect to smoking risks and other valued
attributes. This behavior is consistent with... models of rational behavior ....

."

Id. at 144; "it is unlikely that smoking rates greatly exceed what would prevail in a
fully informed market context." Id.
Other scholars, quoted on the dust jacket of the book, bought Viscusi's argument. For example, Alan Schwartz of Yale Law School stated:
This book combines two disciplines, cognitive psychology and the economics of risk, to make an important contribution to the smoking debate. Viscusi shows that persons in all age groups overestimate smoking risks, as
theory predicts, and that persons behave rationally respecting the smoking decision given their perception of the facts. After these findings, the
smoking decision can justifiably be regulated only in consequence of third
party effects, not because consumers make poor health choices.
Id. Also, Robert D. Tollison of George Mason University stated:
Viscusi's book will provide the intellectual basis and framework for a long
overdue reassessment of the role of government in protecting consumers
and workers from certain types of risky behavior. It should come as no
surprise that the government has once again been overzealous in their
protection of consumers and workers from the dangers of smoking by
mandating hazard warnings on packages, restricting television advertising and imposing restrictions on where smoking is permitted. Viscusi
analyzes the government's actions and offers us some interesting routes
out of the swamp of overprotection.
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On the other hand, there appear to be a number of ways in
which reliance on experiential thinking might lead smokers to fail
to appreciate risks and to act in ways that are not in their best
interests. In particular, the exposure to information that Viscusi
believes causes overestimation of risk cuts both ways. The major
exposure comes from massive advertising campaigns designed to
associate positive imagery and positive affect with cigarette smoking. A recent ad for Kool Natural Lights, for example, featured a
picture of a beautiful waterfall on the cigarette package. In addition, the word "natural" appears 13 times in the ad.
More subtle than the content of cigarette ads is the possibility
that the "mere exposure effect" resulting from viewing them repeatedly also contributes to positive affect and liking for smoking
87
in general and for specific brands of cigarettes in particular.'
Through the workings of the affect heuristic, this positive affect
would be expected not only to enhance one's attraction to smoking
but also to depress the perception of risk. 188
Within the experiential mode of thinking, "seeing is believing,"
and young people in particular are likely to see little or no visible
harm from the smoking done by their friends or themselves. In
this sense, smoking risks are not "available."' 8 9
Viscusi's arguments are also lacking in a number of other respects, as I have indicated in several previous studies. 190 Here I
shall focus on two failings, both of which relate to experiential
thinking. The first reflects the repetitive nature of cigarette smoking and the cumulation of risk over a long period of time. The second reflects young people's failure to appreciate the risks of
becoming addicted to smoking.
"Cigarette smoking is a behavior that takes place one cigarette
at a time." 19 1 A person smoking one pack of cigarettes every day
187. See Bornstein, supra note 42; Zajonc, supra note 41.
188. See Finucane et al., supra note 39.
189. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 146.
190. See Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks?, 47 Duke L.J.
1133 (1998); Paul Slovic, What Does it Mean to Know a Cumulative Risk? Adolescents' Perception of Short-Term and Long-Term Consequences of Smoking, 13 J.
Behav. Decision Making 259 (2000) [hereinafter Slovic I]; Paul Slovic, Rejoinder:
The Perils of Viscusi's Analysis of Smoking Risk Perceptions, 13 J. Behav. Decision
Making 273 (2000).
191. Slovic I, supra note 190, at 261.
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for forty years "lights up" about 300,000 times. 192 Although most
smokers acknowledge a high degree of risk associated with many
years of smoking, many believe they can get away with some lesser
amount of smoking before the risk takes hold. 193 Many young
smokers, in particular, believe that smoking for only a few years
poses negligible risk.19 4

They are more prone to believe in the

safety of short-term smoking than are young nonsmokers. 195
Belief in the near-term safety of smoking combines in an insidious way with a tendency for young smokers to be uninformed
about, or underestimate, the difficulty of stopping smoking.19 6 Recent research indicates that adolescents begin to show evidence of
nicotine dependence within days to weeks of the onset of occasional
use of tobacco. 197 Many young people regret their decision to start
smoking and attempt to stop unsuccessfully. 198 The 1989 Teenage

Attitudes and Practices Survey found that 74% of adolescent smokers reported that they had thought seriously about quitting and
49% had tried to quit in the previous six months.199 A longitudinal
survey conducted as part of the University of Michigan's Monitoring the Future Study found that 85% of high school seniors who
occasionally smoked predicted that they probably, or definitely,
would not be smoking in five years.2 °° Thirty-two percent of high
school seniors who smoked one pack of cigarettes per day made the
same prediction. 20 1 However, in a follow-up study five to six years
later, of those who had smoked at least one pack per day as seniors, only 13% had quit and 69% still smoked one pack or more
per day.20 2 Of those who smoked one to five cigarettes per day as
192. See id. at 1137.
193. See id. at 1137-38.
194. See id. at 1141.
195. See id. at 1138.
196. See Slovic I, supra note 190, at 264.
197. See Joseph R. DiFranza et al., Initial Symptoms of Nicotine Dependence in
Adolescents, 9 Tobacco Control 313 (2000).
198. See Slovic I, supra note 190, at 264.
199. See Karen F. Allen et al., Teenage Tobacco Use: Data Estimates from the
Teenage Attitudes and PracticeSurvey, United States, 1989, 14 Advance Data, No.
224 (1993).
200. See Slovic I, supra note 190, at 264.
201. See id.
202. See id. (citing Lloyd Johnston et al., National Survey Results on Drug Use
From the Monitoring the Future Study (National Institute on Drug Abuse ed.,
1993)); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Preventing Tobacco Use
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seniors, only 30% had quit (60% had expected to do so) and 44%
20 3
had actually increased their cigarette consumption.
The belief pattern that emerges from these and various other
studies is one in which many young smokers perceive themselves
to be at little or no risk from each cigarette smoked because they
expect to stop smoking before any damage to their health occurs. 20 4 In reality, a high percentage of young smokers continue to
smoke over a long period of time despite the fact that they are cer20 5
tainly placed at risk by their habit.
B.

New Data: The Dominance of Experiential Thinking

Viscusi's arguments about perceptions of risk and the informed, choices made by smokers assume the preeminence of the
analytic mode of thinking. Viscusi's beginning smoker is portrayed
as a young economist, rationally weighing the benefits against the
risks before making the fateful decision to start smoking. But the
evidence for smokers' short-term perspectives and underestimation of the grip of addiction suggests that experiential and affective
forces are leading many young people to make smoking decisions
that they later regard as mistakes.
Evidence for this view comes from data recently collected in a
national telephone survey of more than 3,500 individuals conducted on behalf of The Annenberg School for Communication in
the Fall of 1999 and Winter of 2000.206 Households were selected
through random-digit dialing and, within the household, a resident
20 7
aged 14 and older was selected randomly for the interview.
Young people were oversampled. Completed interviews were obtained for 2002 members of a "youth sample" ages 14-22 and 1504
members of an adult sample, ranging in age from 23-95.208 Within
the youth sample, there were 478 smokers and 1524 nonAmong Young People: A Report of the Surgeon General, S/N 017-001-004901-0,
U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res. (1994).
203. See id.
204. See Slovic 1, supra note 190, at 264.
205. See id.
206. See infra app., tbl.5.
207. See id.
208. See id.
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smokers. 20 9 Among adults there were 310 smokers and 1194
2 10
nonsmokers.
Recall that the experiential mode is automatic, feeling based
and not always accessible to conscious awareness. People acting
experientially may not sense that they are consciously deliberat21 1
ing. Experiential thinking is evident throughout the survey.
Almost 80% of the adult smokers surveyed answered "not at all"
when asked if they thought about how smoking might affect their
health when they first began to smoke. 2 12 Young smokers appeared more likely to have thought about health when they began
to smoke, but their most frequent answer was still "not at all."21 3

However, now that they smoke, most of these individuals say they
do think about the health effects. 2 14 A substantial proportion of
smokers also say that, since they have started smoking, they have
heard of health risks they did not know about when they
2 15
started.
Most telling are the answers to questions 19e and 19f. Far
more beginning smokers were thinking about "trying something
new and exciting" than were thinking about health. 2 16 When
asked how long they thought they would continue to smoke when
they first started, the majority of young and older smokers said
that they did not think about it.217
Our data indicate that most smokers neither want to continue
smoking nor expect to do s0.218 The majority of adult and youth
smokers have made more than one attempt to quit 2 19 and about
2 20 Of
65% of the adults and 84% of the youth say they plan to quit.
those who plan to quit, about 78% of the adults and 72% of the
youth plan to do so within the next year. 22 ' When asked whether
209. See id. A "smoker" was defined as someone who said they had smoked at
least one cigarette within the past 30 days.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See infra app., tbl.5. (referring to question 19a).
213. See id.
214. See id. (referring to question 19c).
215. See id. (referring to question 19d).
216. See id. (referring to question 19e).
217. See id. (referring to question 190.
218. See infra app., tbl.5.
219. See infra app., tbl.6.
220. See infra app., tbl.7 (referring to question 29).
221. See id. (referring to question 29a).
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they would have successfully quit smoking if they were called
again in a year, 78% of the adults and 83% of the teens said
2 22

"yes."

Tables 8 and 9 present the responses to these same three questions about quitting, conditioned by the number of past attempts to
quit 2 23 and by the length of time the individual has been smoking.2 24 In Table 8, we see that, except for adults who had never
22 5
tried to quit, a substantial majority of smokers planned to quit

and to do so within the next year, 22 6 even though they had unsuccessfully attempted to quit a number of times before. Thus we see
that, among youth who had attempted to quit ten or more times,
91.3% still planned to quit and 85.7% of those expected to do so in
the first year. 22 7 This estimated one-year time line was lower

(61.1%) when elicited in Question 29b, but it was still far greater
than the "no" response (16.7%).228
Similar optimism about quitting was evident among long-time
smokers. 2 29 Even among those who had been smoking for more
than five years, 64% of adults and 80% of teens planned to quit,
and most of these individuals planned to do so within the next
year. 2 30 The median age of the adults who had been smoking for
more than five years was forty-one, which makes it likely that they
23 1 It is
have actually been smoking for more than twenty years.
noteworthy that these older smokers were as optimistic as young
23 2
smokers about quitting within the next year.
Although we have seen above that most smokers were not
thinking about health risks when they first began to smoke, some
of those who were may have been reassured by the thought that
there is little or no harm to smoking in the short-run. 23 3 Slovic
observed this in a sample of high-school age smokers and the pre222. See id. (referring to question 29b).
223. See infra app., tbl.8.
224. See infra app., tbl.9.
225. See id. (referring to question 29).
226. See id. (referring to questions 29a & 29b).
227. See id. (referring to question 29a).
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See infra app., tbl.9.
231. See id. Note that the longest time in the response options presented by
the interviewer was "more than 5 years."
232. See id.
233. See Slovic I, supra note 190.
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sent findings replicate this result. 23 4 When asked to "Imagine
someone who starts to smoke a pack of cigarettes a day at age 16,"
29.7% of adult smokers and 26.4% of teen smokers agreed with the
statement: "There is usually no risk to the person at all for the first
few years." Agreement was less among non-smokers (18.8% for
adults and 20.6% for teens).
When asked "How long, if ever, do you think it takes for smoking to seriously harm the health of a new smoker?," 44.8% of adult
smokers and 32.0% of teen smokers answered five years or more.
C. Addiction
Loewenstein has proposed a theoretical perspective that portrays addiction as an extreme form of a class of behaviors that are
controlled by "visceral factors." 23 5 Visceral factors include drive
states such as hunger, thirst, sexual desire, moods and emotions,
physical pain and, for addiction, intense craving for a drug or cigarette. 23 6 From the experiential perspective, it is very difficult, if
not impossible, to appreciate one's own susceptibility to visceral influences. As Loewenstein observes: "Unlike currently experienced
visceral factors, which have a disproportionate impact on behavior,
delayed visceral factors tend to be ignored or severely underweighted in decision-making. Today's pain, hunger, anger, etc.
are palpable, but the same sensations anticipated in the future re23 7
ceive little weight."
The survey provides abundant evidence regarding the difficulties of stopping smoking. First, as shown earlier, in Table 6, the
majority of adult and young smokers have attempted to quit, usually more than once. 2 38 Second, despite their lack of success in
quitting, most of these individuals plan to stop smoking in the near
23 9
future.
Another indication of the short-term perspective of smokers
and their misperception of the ease of quitting comes from the finding that only 7.4% of the adult smokers and 4.8% of the teens ex234. See id. at 261-65.
235. See George Loewenstein, A Visceral Account of Addiction, in Getting
Hooked: Rationality and Addiction (1999).
236. See id. at 239.
237. Id. at 240.
238. See infra app., tbl.6.
239. See infra app., tbls.7, 8 & 9.
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pected to smoke for more than 5 years when they began, 240 yet
87.1% of these adults and 26.4% of these teens reported that they
had now been smoking for more than 5 years.
When asked whether they consider themselves addicted to cigarettes, 76.4% of the adult smokers and 58.8% of the teens said
yes. 2 4 1 The proportion of adults and teens who felt addicted increased sharply with the number of attempts to quit and length of
2 42
time smoking.
D. Viscusi's QuantitativeRisk Estimates Are Unreliable
Viscusi has placed great weight in the validity of his quantitative questions about smoking risk perceptions. However, there are
a number of reasons to be suspicious about the reliability of answers to his questions about the relative frequency of lung cancer
among 100 smokers. First, he asks the respondent to estimate the
risks to 100 smokers, not to oneself. Answers for oneself would
likely be lower, as a result of optimism bias. 24 3 Second, Tversky
and Koehler developed and tested a theoretical model, support theory, showing that respondents asked to judge the likelihood for one
focal event (e.g., lung cancer) produce higher probabilities than respondents asked for judgments of the same event in the context of
24 4
other alternative events.
Third, we would expect that young smokers, as experiential
rather than analytical thinkers who do not expect to be smoking
much longer, would not be paying careful attention to tracking
lung cancer rates among smokers. Hence they would not have a
firm, quantitative estimate in their heads.
We tested these suspicions by first replicating Viscusi's line of
questioning and then adding a variation in the question format
along the line suggested by Tversky and Koehler's theory. Early in
the survey, respondents were asked to "Imagine 100 cigarette
smokers, both men and women, who smoked cigarettes their entire
adult lives. How many of these 100 people do you think will die
240.
241.
242.
243.
Behav.

See infra app., tbl.5.
See infra app., tbl.10 (referring to bottom row).
See id. (referring to questions 30 & 31).
See Neil D. Weinstein, Accuracy of Smokers' Risk Perceptions, 20 Annals
Med. 135 (1998).

244. See Amos Tversky & Derek J. Koehler, Support Theory: A Nonextensional
Representationof Subjective Probability, 101 Psychol. Rev. 547, 547-65 (1994).
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from lung cancer?" This question was immediately followed by a
similar question asking about the number of lung cancer deaths
among 100 non-smokers. Next, a third question was presented,
which asked for estimates of the number of deaths among the same
100 smokers from: a) automobile accidents; b) heart disease; c)
stroke; d) lung cancer; and e) all other causes combined.
Table 11 presents the means and standard deviations of the
estimates for lung cancer among the 100 smokers in the first and
third questions. 2 45 The answers to the first question, about lung
cancer alone, were in the range obtained in Viscusi's surveys, with
estimates by the youth sample being larger than estimates by the
adults (60.4 vs. 48.5).24 6 However, the estimates for lung cancer
decrease by more than 50% when made in the context of the other
causes. 24 7 The proportion of respondents who reduced their first
answer when given a small number of alternative causes of death
in Question 3 was 72.6% (adults) and 80.9% (youth).2 48 Furthermore, the correlation between the two estimates, a form of reliability, was very low; only .33 for the adults and .19 for the younger
respondents. 24 9 These results thus replicate and extend findings
25 0
obtained earlier with a sample of university students.
These data indicate that our respondents, young and old alike,
do not have reliable quantitative knowledge about smoking risks.
One can get almost any estimate one wishes for lung cancer (or
other smoking-induced causes of death) simple by varying the
number of other causes that are also being judged. This conclusion
is consistent with other theoretical and empirical research demonstrating the dependence of quantitative judgments such as these
on the form of the question and response scale. 2 5 1 It is also consistent with the view that smokers are not thinking analytically
about the risks they are taking.

245. See infra app., tbl.11.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248.

See id.

249. See infra app., figs.4 & 5.
250.

See Paul Slovic, Rejoinder: The Perils of Viscusi's Analysis of Smoking

Risk Perceptions, 13 J. Behav. Decision Making 273 (2000).
251. See, e.g., Tversky & Koehler, supra note 244; Slovic et aL, supra note 22.
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E.

The Failure of Rationality

Viscusi argued that smokers were making an informed, rational decision to smoke. 2 52 Viscusi asserted that the key question
pertaining to the failure of the rational model is one in which an
individual, asked to go back in time to the moment of decision and
repeat the choice, would not make the same choice again. 253
Slovic asked that question in a small survey of smokers at the
University of Oregon and in a poll of Oregon residents. The new
telephone survey asked it as well of all smokers: "If you had it to do
2 54
over again, would you start smoking?"
The results, shown in Table 12, are clear. More than 85% of
adult smokers and about 80% of teen smokers answered "no."25 5
Moreover, the pattern of responses shown in the table was similar
for both young and old smokers.2 5 6 The more they felt addicted to
cigarettes, the more often they had tried to quit, the longer they
had been smoking, and the more cigarettes they were smoking per
25 7
day, the more likely they were to say "no."
Recall Viscusi's central question: "at the time when individuals initiate their smoking activity, do they understand the consequences of their actions and make rational decisions?"2 5 8 The data
presented here indicate that the answer to this question is "no."25 9
Most beginning smokers do not appreciate how their future selves
will perceive the risks from smoking and value the tradeoff be°
tween health and the need to smoke. 26
This is a strong repudiation of the model of informed rational
choice. It fits well with the findings indicating that smokers give
little conscious thought to risk when they begin to smoke. 2 6 1 They
appear to be lured into the behavior by the prospects of fun and
252.
253.

See Viscusi I, supra note 172.
See W. Kip Viscusi, Deposition in the Matter of R. J. Reynolds Tobacco

Matter, No. D09285, Sept. 24, 1998.
254. Slovic, supra note 250.
255. See infra app., tbl.12.
256. See id.

257. The perception that smoking was risky to one's health also correlated significantly with the "no" response for both young and adult smokers.
258. Viscusi, supra note 172.
259.
260.
261.

See id.
See id.
See id.
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excitement. 26 2 Most begin to think of risk only after starting to
smoke and gaining what to them is new information about health
26 3
risks.
The increased likelihood of repudiating the earlier decision,
exhibited by those who have been smoking for the longest time,
those who are currently smoking the most cigarettes, those who
perceive themselves at high risk from smoking, those who have
tried most often to quit, and those who acknowledge their addiction, paints a sad portrait of individuals who are unable to control
a behavior that they have come to recognize as harmful.
These disturbing findings underscore the distinction that behavioral decision theorists now make between decision utility and
experience utility. 264 This distinction arises from numerous stud-

ies of persons experiencing very good outcomes (e.g., winning the
lottery) or very bad ones (e.g., becoming paraplegic, testing positive
for HIV). Winning the lottery leaves people much less happy than
expected and people adjust to being paraplegic or HIV positive
much better than expected. 26 5 In the case of smoking, the discrepancy between decision utility and experience utility underscores
the veracity of Loewenstein's visceral account of addiction.
V.

CONCLUSION: RATIONAL ACTORS AND RATIONAL

FOOLS

We can see now that the central question underlying this Symposium: "Rational Actors or Rational Fools?" was oversimplified.
Rationality is not only a product of the analytical mind, but of the
experiential mind as well. As Damasio observed:
The strategies of human reason probably did not develop, in
either evolution or any single individual, without the guiding
force of the mechanisms of biological regulation, of which
emotion and feeling are notable expressions. Moreover, even
after reasoning strategies became established .
their ef262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, 3
Legal Theory 105 (1997); Daniel Kahneman & Jackie Snell, Predictinga Changing
Taste: Do People Know What They Like?, 5 J. Behav. Decision Making 187 (1992);
George Lewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? PredictingFutureFeelings, in Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 85-105 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
265. See Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J. Personality & Social Psychol. 917 (1978).
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fective deployment probably depends, to a considerable ex286
tent, on a continued ability to experience feelings.
Ironically, the perception and integration of affective feelings,
within the experiential system, may be the kind of high-level maximization process postulated by economic theories since the days of
Jeremy Bentham. These feelings form the neural and psychological substrate of utility. In this sense, the affect heuristic enables
us to be rational actors in many important situations. But not in
all situations. It works beautifully when our experience enables us
to anticipate accurately how much we will like the consequences of
our decisions. It fails miserably when the consequences turn out to
be much different in character than we anticipated.
In the latter situations, the Rational Actor becomes the Rational Fool.

266.

Damasio, supra note 29, at xii.
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APPENDIX

TABLE 1
TWO MODES OF THINKING.

COMPARISON OF THE EXPERIENTIAL
2 67
AND RATIONAL SYSTEMS

Experiential System

Rational System

1. Holistic
2. Affective: Pleasure-pain oriented

1. Analytic
2. Logical: Reason oriented (what is
sensible)
3. Logical connections
4. Behavior mediated by conscious
appraisal of events
5. Encodes reality in abstract symbols,
words, and numbers
6. Slower processing: Oriented toward
delayed action
7. Requires justification via logic and
evidence

3. Associationistic connections
4. Behavior mediated by "vibes" from
past experiences
5. Encodes reality in concrete images,
metaphors, and narratives
6. More rapid processing: Oriented
toward immediate action
7. Self-evidently valid: "experiencing is
believing"

TABLE 2
IMAGES, RATINGS AND SUMMATION SCORES FOR ONE
RESPONDENT

Stimulus
SAN
SAN
SAN
SAN
SAN
SAN

DIEGO
DIEGO
DIEGO
DIEGO
DIEGO
DIEGO

2 68

Image
number

Image

1
2
3
4
5
6

very nice
good beaches
zoo
busy freeway
easy to find way
pretty town

1
2
3
4
5
6

high
crowded
cool
pretty
busy airport
busy streets

Image
rating

Sum=
DENVER
DENVER
DENVER
DENVER
DENVER
DENVER

Sums

2
2
2
1
1
2
10
2
0
2
1
-2
-2
1

Note. Based on these summation scores, this person's predicted preference for a
vacation site would be San Diego.

267. See Epstein, supra note 25.
268. See Slovic et al., supra note 58.

204 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:163
TABLE
ATTRIBUTES OF

Dictionary A
Dictionary B

Two

3

DICTIONARIES IN HSEE'S STUDY 2 6 9

Year of
publication

Number
of entries

1993
1993

10,000
20,000

Any defects?
No, it's like new
Yes, the cover is torn;
otherwise it's like new

TABLE 4
PROPORTION DOMINANCE AND AIRPORT SAFETY
Saving a percentage of 150 lives receives higher support ratings than does saving 150
lives.
Potential Benefit

Mean support
Median,
% of ratings L 13

Save
150 lives

Save
98%

Save
95%

Save
90%

Save
85%

10.4
9.8
37

13.6
14.3
75

12.9
14.1
69

11.7
11.3
35

10.9
10.8
31

'cell entries in these rows describe mean and median responses to the question: "How
much would you support this proposed measure to purchase the new equipment?"
(Critics argue that the money spent on this system could be better spent enhancing
other aspects of airport safety). The response scale ranged from 0 (would not support at
all) to 20 (very strong support). An overall ANOVA resulted in F 4, 20 = 3.36, p = .01. The
save 98% and save 95% conditions were beth significantly different from the save 150
lives condition at p < .05, Tukey HSD test.

269.

See Hsee I, supra note 78.
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TABLE 5

PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE BEGINNING SMOKER

Adult Smokers
. N=310
19a. When you first started
to smoke, how much did
you think about how
smoking might affect
your health?

A lot
A little
Not at all
Don't Know/refuse

19c.

A lot
A little
Not at all
Don't Know/refuse

How much do you
think about the health
effects of smoking now?

19d. Since you started smoking,
have you heard of any
health risks of smoking
that you didn't know
about when you started?

Young Smokers
N=478

Yes
No
Don't Know/refuse

19e. When you first started
smoking, did you think
more about how smoking
would affect your future
health or about how you
were trying something
new and exciting?

Thought about future
health
Thought about trying
something new and
exciting
Other
Don't know/refuse

19f. When you first started
smoking, how long did
you think you would
continue to smoke?

A few days
A few months
Less than 1 year
1-5 years
More than 5 years
Didn't think about it
Don't know/refuse

TABLE

6

ABOUT HOW MANY TIMES, IF ANY, HAVE YOU TRIED TO
QUIT SMOKING?

Adult Smokers

Young Smokers

(N = 310)

(N = 478)

0
1

21.3
16.8

38.1
21.8

2-4
5-9
10+

38.4
11.6
9.4

30.1
4.0
4.8

2.6

1.3

Don't know/refuse
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TABLE 7
QuirrING SMOKING

PERSPECTIVES ON

Adult Smokers Young Smokers
N = 478
N = 310
29.

Yes
No
Don't Know/refuse

65.5
30.6
3.9

83.7
13.2
3.1

Next 6 months
6 months to 1 year
More than 1 year from now
Don't Know/refuse

49.3
24.1
15.8
10.8

57.0
19.5
18.2
5.2

Yes
No
Don't Know/refuse

77.8
11.4
10.7

83.3
9.8
6.9

Do you plan to quit
smoking?

29a. When are you planning
to quit?

29b. If we called you in a
year, would you guess
that you would have
successfully quit
smoking?

TABLE

8

PLANS TO QUIT SMOKING BY NUMBER OF PAST ATTEMPTS TO QUIT

Number of Attempts to Quit
0
AS
Q29

Do you plan to
quit smoking?

Yes
No
Don't know

5-9

1-4
YS

AS

YS

AS

10+

YS

AS

YS

39.4 74.7 67.8 89.5 88.9 100.0 79.3 91.3
0.0 20.7 8.7
54.6 22.0 28.1 7.7 11.1
0.0 0.0 0.0
6.1 3.3 4.1 2.8 0.0

Q29a When are you
planning to quit?

Next 6 mo.
38.5 56.6 46.6 55.0 62.5
6 mo - 1 yr
26.9 15.4 27.6 23.0 18.8
> 1 yr from now 15.4 23.5 17.2 16.3 15.6
Don't know
19.2 4.4 8.6 5.9 3.1

57.9 52.2 76.2
21.0 17.4 9.5
15.8 8.7 9.5
5.3 21.7 4.8

Q29b If called in a
year, would you
have quit?

Yes
No
Don't know

88.2 86.7 81.4 85.0 69.2
0.0 7.1 9.3 9.2 19.2
11,8 6.1 9.3 5.8 11.5

66.7 56.2 61.1
26.7 25.0 16.7
6.7 18.8 22.2

Note: AS represents adult smokers and YS represents young smokers.
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TABLE 9
PLANS TO QUIT SMOKING BY LENGTH OF TIME SMOKING

Length of time smoking
For month
or less
AS
Q29

Do you plan to
quit smoking?

Q29a When are you
planning to quit?

About
I year

YS

AS YS

1-5 years > 5 years
AS

YS

AS

YS

Yes
No

-

81.4
15.2

-

Don't know

-

3.4

-

Next 6 mo.

-

85.4

-

55.8 39.1 51.8 50.0 54.5

6 mo - 1 yr
> 1 yr from now
Don't know

-

6.2
2.1
6.2

-

28.8 17.4 21.6 25.6 16.8
7.7 17.4 22.1 15.7 23.8
7.7 26.1 4.5 8.7 5.0

86.4 92.3 81.5 75.4 80.6

82.5 74.2 87.3 63.7 80.2
14.3 25.8 11.0 32.2 15.9
3.2

0.0

1.8

4.1

4.0

Yes

-

90.9

-

year, would you

No

-

6.8

-

6.8

7.7 10.3 12.3 12.5

have quit?

Don't know

-

2.3

-

6.8

0.0

Q29b If called in a

8.2 12.3

6.9

Note: AS represents adult smokers and YS represents young smokers.

TABLE 10

Do

YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF ADDICTED TO CIGARETTES OR NOT?

Adult Smokers
Yes

No

Q30. About how many times, if 0
any, have you tried to quit 1
smoking?
2-4
5-9
10+

59.1 37.9
76.9 23.1
78.2 21.0
91.7 8.3
93.1 6.9

Q31. How long have you

-

-

-

- 1 year

-

-

-

1-5 years
> 5 years

64.5 35.5
79.6 19.6
76.4 22.6

smoked?

All Respondents

Few months

Young Smokers
No

Don't
know

41.2
56.7
75.7
73.7
91.3

57.7
43.3
24.3
26.3
8.7

1.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

3.4

96.6

0.0

33.3

65.1

1.6

64.5 35.5
88.1 11.1
58.8 40.4

0.0
0.8
0.8

Don't
know Yes
3.0
0.0
0.8
0.0
0.0

or less
0.0
0.7
1.0
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TABLE 11
JUDGED DEATHS FROM LUNG CANCER AMONG 100 SMOKERS
Adult sample

Youth sample

(N = 1416)

Question 1

Mean

s.d.

48.5

27.4

(N = 2002)
Mean

s.d.

60.4

25.1
r 13 = .19

r 13 = .33
Question 3
% Q3 < Q1

23.5
72.6

17.5

28.3
80.9

19.4

TABLE 12
SMOKING: WOULD You START AGAIN?

Adult Smokers
(N = 310)
Yes
No

Young Smokers
(N = 478)
Yes
No

11.9

85.5

17.0

80.1

11.4
14.3
7.7
11.1
16.2

86.9
81,4
90.4
85.6
83,8

13.9
21.8
7.1
15.3
20.4

84.3
74.6
92.9
80.9
77.0

Number of times tried to quit?
0
1-4
5-9
10+

27.3
9.4
8.3
0.0

66.7
88.3
91.7
100.0

22.5
14.5
10.5
4.4

73.1
83.9
84.2
95.6

How long have you smoked?
_<few months
1 year
1-5 years
> 5 years

19.4
11.1

80.7
86.3

22.0
20.6
16.7
13.5

74.6
76.2
79.4
86.5

Cigarettes smoked per day last 30 days?
< 1
1-5
6-10
11-14
15-19
20
> 20

16.1
10.5
10.0
11.1
15.4
10.4
11.4

83.9
89.5
88.0
86.1
82.0
85.1
86.4

25.3
18.9
19.4
13.4
5.9
7.0
12.1

69.5
77.5
79.6
83.6
91.2
93.0
87.9

Overall
Do you consider yourself addicted to cigarettes?
Yes
No
More than average
Same as average
less than average

Notes: Same patterns for adults and teens with sense of being addicted, trying
unsuccessfully to quit, having smoked for longer time, smoking more cigarettes/day.
Sense of being addicted goes with trying unsuccessfully to quit, length of time smoking,
and amount smoked per day.

2000]
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FIGURE 1270

Vendor H

VendorL

Stimuli in ice cream study by Hsee (1998). Participants were given the sizes of the
cups and the amounts of ice cream.

FIGURE 2271

Perceived
benefit

Perceived
risk

A model of the affect heuristic explaining the risk/benefit confounding observed by
Alhakami and Slovic (1994). Judgments of risk and benefit are assumed to be derived by reference to an overall affective evaluation of the stimulus item.

270.
271.

See Hsee I, supra note 78.
See Finucane et al., supra note 39.
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FIGURE 3272

A

B

Nuclear Power

Nuclear Power

Affect
:

, )

Information says

Risk inferred

Inforrnation says

Risk inferred

'Benefit is high"

to be low

"Risk Is kow"

to be high

C

D
Nuclear Power

Information says
"Benefit is low"

Nuclear Power

Risk inferred
to be high

Information says
"Risk is high"

Risk inferred
to be low

Model showing how information about benefit (A) or information about risk (B)
could increase the overall affective evaluation of nuclear power and lead to inference about risk and benefit that coincide affectively the information given. Similarly, information could decrease the overall affective evaluation of nuclear power
as in C and D resulting in inferences that are opposite those in A and B.

272. See id.
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# Lung Cancer Deaths: Judgment 1
Sunflower plot showing the relationship between adult respondents' estimates of
lung cancer deaths among 100 smokers. Judgment 1 asked only about lung cancer. Judgment 2 asked about lung cancer and other causes of death. Open circles
represent 1 respondent. Multiple cases at a point are represented by the number
of petals on the sunflower.
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FIGURE 5
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# Lung Cancer Deaths: Judgment 1
Sunflower plot showing the relationship between young respondents' estimates of
lung cancer deaths among 100 smokers. Judgment 1 asked only about lung cancer. Judgment 2 asked about lung cancer and other causes of death. Open circles
represent 1 respondent. Multiple cases at a point are represented by the number
of petals on the sunflower.
#
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